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Abstract
In this paper, it is argued that „pain" is an ambiguous term, 
given that  a term's meaning is determined by its usage. I show 
that the official definition of the International Association for 
the Study of Pain does not meet the necessary  conditions of 
definitions in general. Pathological and nonpathological cases 
provide evidence that  there is no common feature shared in all 
cases falling under „pain“. With the ambiguity of „pain“ 
established, I sketch the consequences for a scientific inquiry 
into pain, and for ethical theories working with pain as a 
relevant concept.
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1.  Introduction: Unified in Pain 
 It seems like pain ought to be one of the most clear cut 
terms, given how much we invest to get rid of it: 34.3 billion $ a 
year are spent in Australia alone on chronic pain; 80% of all 
visits to the doctor are pain related. Given the amount of 
resources we – patients, companies, and governments allike – 
spend on research, treatment and alleviation, we have to ask 
ourselves: Is it one thing we are concerned with? This would 
determine whether we are fighting a war against a common 
enemy on different fronts, or whether we are locked in a bar 
brawl without a unifying strategy or common cause on either 
side. Our intuition surely  is that  the term „pain“ actually refers 
to a homogeneous family of phenomena, one whose members 
2share a commonality. It is exactly this belief of the unity of pain 
that will be questioned and denied in this paper. In contrast, I 
will argue for a strategy of divide and conquer in science and 
ethics.
2.  The Ambiguity of „Pain“ in Science and Subjects' Reports
It was on their IVth World Congress in 1984 that the IASP phrased a 
highly influential definition of „pain“. The IASP's definition (IASPDf) 
reflects our intuitions from an experiencer's view point quite well: 
Pain: An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience 
associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or 
described in terms of such damage.
Imagine stubbing your foot on the wardrobe. The sensation felt is unpleasant, 
and it may anger you to live through it.  Surely, this is associated with the 
damage just inflicted upon your toe. 
However, we should not be too benevolent with this definition. 
Defining is a game with high stakes, as definitions express universal 
equivalents.  This entails that one single counterexample negates a definition 
as fitting: If it is possible that p without q, then it is not universally true that p 
and q come together.  The IASP acknowledges the testability of their 
definition in a note to their official definition:
Note: [...] Many people report pain in the absence of tissue 
damage or any likely pathophysiological cause [...]. If they 
regard their experience as pain and if they report it in the 
same ways as pain caused by tissue damage, it should be 
accepted as pain.
If a patient talks about pain,  and this pain does not exhibit unpleasantness, 
being a sensation, being an emotion, being experienced, is associated with, or 
is described in terms of tissue damage, we know that these are unnecessary 
features of pain. This is exactly why IASPDf fails: Counterexamples are 
available, and no single feature mentioned is shared by all things subsumed 
under „pain“  which is not also shared by a number of other things clearly not 
being pain.
If we concentrate on reports by patients, then we need to bracket 
being an experience: It is entailed by the report that the pain was also 
experienced. This caveat does not challenge the overall argument. There 
might be the possibility of unconscious pain. Then, being an experience is 
also not necessary. If on the other hand unconscious pains are indeed 
impossible, then being an experience does not distinguish pains from other 
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3experiences like warmth or blueness, and the IASPDf fails for this reason. 
(Another remark on the side: IASPDf assumes pain to be composite of 
sensation and emotion without determining the relation between the both. A 
way out is to assume a somatic theory of emotions, making emotions 
sensations; but it is a risky manoeuvre to tie the success of a definition of 
pain to the truth of a specific theory of emotions.)
First then, unpleasantness: The majority of pains is unpleasant, but 
this is not true of all pains. One can refer to masochism, in which something 
is experienced as being pain and eliciting sexual pleasure.  As unclear as the 
phenomenology of masochistic pain might be, we still have to acknowledge 
the possibility of experiencing pain as pleasant, and this rejects the necessity 
of unpleasantness for pain. Less juicy but more spicy: the hotness of food is a 
mild form of pain as the capsaicin triggers pain receptor. In tasting, we 
sometimes misattribute the pain experience as being a taste experience, yet 
we enjoy this oral pain and often even ask for more. These are two examples 
of pain being pleasant. 
Yet, Pain can be also neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Patients with 
pain asymbolia „recognize pain but lack appropriate motor and emotional 
responses to painful stimuli applied anywhere on the body surface.“  Pain 
asymbolics are able to classify noxious stimuli as painful; in their 
judgements, a sensation falls under the class of „pain“. However, they were 
indifferent to the painful stimulus. Pain asymbolia is, as Nikola Grahek 
argued, a case of pain without negative evalutaion, and therefore, of pain 
without unpleasantness; it is also case of pain without pleasantness.
The case of pain asymbolics also raises doubts for the necessity of 
pain being emotionally charged; but one does not need to refer to 
pathologies: Being hypnotised during dentistry is a state in which pain is felt 
as pain, but not as being tied to an emotion. Jesse Prinz, proposing a somatic 
theory of emotions, points out that pain can be a pain without being 
accompanied by an emotion. He argues further that the unpleasantness of 
pain is redundant, as it is accounted for by the accompanying emotions: „Pain 
feels bad because it contains anxiety, not because it is valent.“
This leaves being a sensation,  although „sensation“  can have 
different meanings: in the case of meaning „being experienced“, we have 
already provided an argument above. Yet, „sensation“  might also mean 
„being felt in a sensual way“. This again can be understood in two ways: As 
being a perception or as being a merely feeling of the body. The difference is 
crucial, as perception entails veridicality, i.e. when I perceive a bottle 
standing on the table, then there is necessarily a bottle on the table. 
Otherwise, I am having a bottle illusion. This does not hold for mere feelings: 
A dreamt itch is still itchy. 
Is pain a perception? Transitive or intransitive? A perception is 
transitive if and only if a person perceives something other with her body. 
This entails intersubjective accessibility in the same mode of perception. 
However, you and I cannot perceive the same tissue damage in the same 
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4perceptual modality; only one alone person feels one individual pain. To 
allow bodily sensations to still be perceptions, Armstrong introduced the 
notion of intransitive perceptions: a person perceives the body with the body. 
Tickles, itches and orgasms might fall under this category, but does pain? 
Phantom limb pain is a clear counterexample: the sufferer feels pain in a 
body where there is no body. If pain is a perception, and perceptions are 
veridical, then phantom limb pain can only be a pain hallucination. Surely, 
one does not want to claim that these patients are merely hallucinating pain – 
they are in real pain. 
Pain is therefore not necessarily a perception. Is it necessarily 
bodily? Contrary to our intuitions, there are actual cases in which people talk 
about pains without it being a bodily sensation. There is pain that is a 
sensation, but is not embedded into one's own body image: Empathic pain, 
feeling the pain of others as pain. Empathic pain might lack the incorporation 
into one's own body image, but shares the negative evaluation and a need to 
act upon, while still being a sensation. This point is supported by the studies 
of Singer et al., in which subjects where asked to rate the painfulness and 
unpleasantness of merely watched in contrast to actually felt painful stimuli, 
and did so significantly similar, „irrespective of whether the pain was applied 
to themselves or to the partner.“  The neural correlate of empathic pain is also 
part of the neural pain matrix of actual pain; furthermore, it feels painful to 
the empathic subjects without being phenomenally incorporated into their 
own body image. 
What we are left with is associated with tissue damage and 
described in terms of tissue damage.  Association is too arbitrary to count as 
necessary. Laughing hysterically about somebody who just fell down the 
stairs – an instance of Schadenfreude – can also be an unpleasant sensation, 
followed by shame and associated with tissue damage; just with somebody 
else's. This is definitively not pain, even though it is strictly in accordance 
with the IASP's definition. We also ought to be reluctant to claim 
describability as a necessary condition for pain: Think of a newborn baby 
being slapped. Surely,  she screams and feels pain without describing it. Even 
if left alone, she has pain without anybody ascribing it to her. We should hold 
on to our intuition that pain is not description-dependant. Pain existed before 
language, descriptions, theories, linguistic or social communities were 
around, fulfilling in most cases an important evolutionary function. 
As we have seen, none of the features deemed necessary by IASPDf 
is actually necessary: Pain can be a sensation and emotion without being 
unpleasant, as in the case of masochism or spicy food. Pain can also be an 
unpleasant emotion without being a bodily sensation, as in the case of 
phantom limb pain. Pain can be a sensation without being unpleasant or an 
emotion, as in the case of pain asymbolia. Pain can also be an unpleasant 
emotion and sensation without being tied to the body or being owned by the 
experiencer. Still,  these phenomena can be called „pain“  felicitously. In 
conclusion, „pain“  refers not to one class, but a cluster of different 
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5phenomena. It is impossible to give a real definition for cluster terms like 
„pain“ as they necessarily lack a unifying feature. 
4. Consequences for Science
If „pain“  is an ambiguous term, then pain science cannot be 
reductive. Reduction is a relation between terms of two theories,  and all 
terms referring to family resemblances are impossible to reduce as the 
reduction relation cannot hold between the ambiguous usage of normal 
language and the exact usage of scientific language. 
However, this does not mean that there can be no science of pain; 
The claim is merely that „pain“  needs to be somehow broken down into a 
coherent classes of phenomena,  which in turn might be reducable. 
Explication, as Carnap called this process, is not a one-to-one-relation, but a 
one-to-many-relation. The usage of a normal language term is analysed and 
parts of its usages are rebuilt in the exact language of a given science, namely 
physics; e.g. „Water“  can be explicated as „H2O“  even though „H2O“ is not 
synonymous to water in every case: „My old cat can't hold his water any 
longer.“ 
But is this picture of explication transferable to pain science? 
Hardly, as we are dealing with a term referring to a phenomenal experience. 
At the moment, we are lacking an acceptable theory of the physical basis of 
consciousness. Given this general epistemic hindrance, it seems impossible to 
know which explications in physical language are adequate. 
Given the constraints for space, I can only sketch an alternative: In 
the critique of the IASPDf, we relied not on physical language, but on 
phenomenological reports. It therefore seems possible to explicate „pain“  a 
language referring to phenomena. We would aim for structural explications, 
i.e. naming more fine grained elements and their relation to each other. In the 
case of „pain“, such elements might be evaluation, personhood,  ownership, 
integration into a body image, etc. The phenomenological explication will get 
us a class of possible structures of conscious experience which show some 
family resemblance to paradigmatic cases of pain. They will in turn enable 
patients to express their own experience in a more adequate way – something 
Virginia Woolf called for when she  wrote that „[t]he merest schoolgirl, when 
falling in love, has Shakespeare and Keats to speak for her; but let a sufferer 
try to describe a pain in his head to a doctor and language at once runs dry.“
This structural taxonomy is expressed in the form of relations of 
elements to each other. Given a specific relation R(a,x), we might now search 
for commonalities in the neural basis. It might very well be the case that two 
different groups of neural events elicit mental state x, e.g. p and q; a can stand 
in a relation with xp or with xq. Given this possible result, it seems worthy to 
inquire whether there is a felt difference between an R(a,xp)-pain with an R(a, 
xq)-pain. If there is a felt difference, we have a further taxonomy which was 
unavailable from the experiencer's viewpoint alone. If there is no felt 
difference, science will learn something about the minimally sufficient grain 
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6level of the supervenience base of conscious R(a,x)-pain. This general sketch 
illustrates what Ayede and Güzeldere proclaimed: Pain science might be a 
paradigmatic case for a science of consciousness per se.
5. Consequences for Ethics
The most practical lesson the ambiguity of pain teaches us is in 
ethics, as pain and pleasure were seen as antipodes by many theorists. 
Consider Jeremy Bentham:
A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the 
interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum 
total of his pleasures; or,  what comes to the same thing, to 
diminish the sum total of his pains.
Being able to feel pain or pleasure has thereby constrained the 
application of ethical theories like Bentham's utilitarianism. A utilitarian 
holds that the moral value of an action is determined by its manipulation of 
the ratio of pleasure to pain.  Here,  a moral object (something we have to act 
morally towards) can only be an entity that is able to feel pleasure or pain. 
Therefore, a puppy probably is a moral object, while a table is not. Consider 
compassionism: the driving force behind acting ethically is our ability to feel 
the pain of others and wanting to prevent it. This entails that our ability to 
feel empathic pain constitutes the class of moral subjects, (the class of entities 
able to perform moral acts). In conclusion, the ability to feel certain kinds of 
pain determines whether a given ethical theory is applicable in a given case.
Mind though whether the judgement „X is in pain!“  is true depends 
on which understanding we have of „pain“. The ambiguity of „pain“  then 
calls for a revision of such moral theories in at least two ways. First, the case 
of masochism and pain asymbolia show that pain is not the antipode to 
pleasure: Pain can be pleasant, or it can be neither pleasant nor unpleasant. In 
conclusion, not every pain is ethically relevant. Therefore, the first challenge 
for ethical theorists is clarifying exactly which kinds of pain are ethically 
relevant.  I suggest: Only those pains that incorporate negative emotions like 
anxiety and whose prolonged having enslaves the ability of shifting one‘s 
attention away from them. Here, pain is only relevant in virtue of its 
emotional charge.The implication for treatment is: To teach emotional 
control. 
Secondly,  as we are becoming more and more aware of the varieties 
of pain experiences and their affordances to a neural basis, it is more and 
more evident that lots of non-human entities like animals (but possibly 
artificial life forms as well) are able to feel pain in a morally relevant sense. 
However, it is also clear that some individuals are not able to feel such 
morally relevant pains. This will determine whether e.g. experiments on 
encephalopodes are permissable – a case in which our moral intuitions falter.
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7The elucidation of  the application of some ethical theories depends 
on the one hand on ethicists clarifying which pains are morally relevant, and 
on the other hand on scientists revealing  which neural bases elicit which pain 
experiences. In conclusion, the ambiguity of „pain“  calls strongly for a 
revision of established ethical theories, and also for a revision of our relation 
to our closest and most distant non-human relatives and offspring. The 
simplistic talk of pain and pleasure in ethics cannot go on in the light of this 
evident conceptual unclarity. 
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